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RESPONSE TO DAVIS 
James A. Keller 
I appreciate Davis' gracious reply to my paper. The responses it has evoked 
from him and others have taught me much, and I am now much more prepared 
to grant that it can be rational for a Christian to believe in the resurrection in 
Davis' sense. I still do not think that view is without serious problems, but there 
are also good historical reasons for it, which create problems for one who denies 
or minimizes these reasons, as I did. These reasons are summarized in Davis' 
Section IV. Of them, the ones I find most troublesome to a Christian who doubts 
Davis' view are those supporting the belief that the tomb was empty. Though 
this is not the basic reason for affirming the resurrection in some sense, it does 
contribute more to defining the sense in which Jesus was raised than do the 
claims that Jesus appeared to various people.' 
On the other hand, Davis' original paper also suggested that those who doubt 
the resurrection in his sense do so primarily because of a commitment to anti super-
naturalism. 2 This suggestion was an important reason for my writing my original 
paper. I wanted to point out some of the historical and literary problems with 
his view of the resurrection, problems which he barely mentioned in his original 
paper. I still do not believe that his suggestion about the importance of anti super-
naturalism is correct, though I do admit that typically it is one factor, among 
others, which influences Christians to seek or adopt some other understanding 
of the resurrection. But this factor does not usually stand alone, nor is it necessarily 
basic. Rather, like supernaturalism, it is embedded in a total understanding of 
Christian faith. The reasons why a person accepts some particular understanding 
of Christian faith rather than another are typically very complex, and anyone 
factor-such as antisupernaturalism (or supernaturalism)-will be of differing 
importance in the thought of different people. I would have been far more 
sympathetic to Davis' suggestion as it relates to Christians who differ from him 
on the resurrection if he had spoken in terms of this total understanding of 
Christian faith rather than in terms of antisupernaturalism (or naturalism). But 
even so, I would still think that the historical and literary problems with his view 
can playa larger role than he suggests. In my earlier paper I pointed out some 
of these problems, and some more will appear here in my reply to Davis. Space 
precludes a full reply to all his points, but I will focus on what seem to me to be 
the most important places where I still differ from him. 
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In my earlier paper I did not argue that the mere fact that the Gospels were written 
years after the event implies that they are unreliable. But it does allow a gap in 
which elaborations, distortions, and outright additions may have been made to the 
earliest traditions. I admit that very early material may be found at various points in 
the Gospels. But this general admission does not settle the issue of whether this 
or that detail is historically reliable, and on such matters even New Testament 
scholars often disagree. I do not claim to have the expertise to contribute to settling 
them, but I would like to comment on one principle which Davis (and others) some-
times suggest in defense of the historical reliability of various narratives. 
This principle is that if some document reached canonical form (or some ele-
ment of tradition existed) during the lifetime of an eyewitness, then our justificat 
tion in taking it as historically reliable is increased, for if it were not accurate, the 
eyewitness would have criticized it. I concede that there are contexts in which this 
claim has some merit, for it is unlikely that anyone in the community, other than 
another eyewitness, would deliberately disagree with what some eyewitness said, 
particularly if the eyewitness were a person of some prominence. (It should not be 
forgotten how often even eyewitnesses themselves disagree about an event.) And 
being an eyewitness of Jesus was itselflikely to give the person some prominence. 
But from the fact that some element of tradition has come down to us today with 
no indication of its being challenged in the New Testament community, all we can 
conclude is that no eyewitness made an objection to it effectively known in the 
community. But his not doing this need not imply that he agreed with the tradition. 
The tradition may not have come to his attention; this possibility must be kept in 
mind, given the spread of the New Testament church and difficulties in repro-
ducing and transmitting documents.' Even if it did come to his attention, the dis-
crepancies may not have seemed to him to be of sufficient importance to say any-
thing. And even ifhe did say something, his criticism may not have been picked up 
by later writers. Unless we have reason to rule out these possibilities in relation to 
a particular element of tradition, we cannot use the fact that it includes statements 
which an eyewitness could have refuted as a basis for confidence in the historical 
reliability of the statements. 
As I said, I do not deny that the principle can sometimes be usefully employed, 
particularly when we can trace the origin of the tradition to a community in which 
there were eyewitnesses. Thus, I think it is most likely to be useful in relation to 
an element of the tradition which can be traced to Jerusalem in the first few years 
of the Christian community. For then we can be confident that there were eye-
witnesses in the community in which the tradition originated; this contrasts with 
situations in which the eyewitnesses were in a different community and could at 
most have criticized the tradition only after it had gained enough stability to begin 
to circulate. 
Davis misunderstands my point in claiming that the resurrection was an inference 
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from certain experiences which certain disciples claimed to have. He correctly 
points out (p. 102) that something's being an inference is no reason to doubt it. But 
my point was not to question the truth of the claim that Jesus had been raised, but 
rather its meaning. If a claim is an inference, then its meaning may well depend at 
least in part on the premises from which the inference is made, particularly if there 
is some unclarity in the claim itself. In my earlier paper, I claimed that the meaning 
of "resurrection" in first-century Palestine was somewhat unclear; in making this 
claim, I was relying on Marxsen' s argument that the influence of Hellenistic 
Judaism on this matter had by then already made itself felt in Palestine and on the 
possibility that Christians might have originally used the term in a somewhat 
special sense." If either is correct, we might be able to reduce the unclarity if we 
knew what the experiences were like which led the church to say that Jesus had 
been raised. Here questions about the reliability of the Gospel accounts of the 
appearances and the empty tomb become apparent. The former are questioned 
even by some defenders of the resurrection in Davis' sense.' Thus, though I admit 
that the term 'resurrection' (or its Greek equivalent) was used very early to explain 
how the disciples' experiences could occur, that does not mean that in these first 
uses the term had the same meaning which it had when the Gospels were written. 
At that later time, the meaning had been developed in a certain way, but was that 
meaning the original one? It may have been, but I do not believe that this can sim-
ply be assumed. Of course, Davis does not simply assume it, but his reasons are 
claims about the appearances and the empty tomb and the meaning of the concept 
in first -century Palestine. 6 
Davis says (p. 102-103) that certain early Christians (Mary Magdelene, Peter, 
Thomas) did not have to rely on the experiences of other Christians, for they saw 
the risen Jesus. I agree that some early Christians must have had an experience 
which the church called "seeing the risen Jesus." But this admission does not imply 
that we have an eyewitness account of what that seeing involved or an accurate later 
account of it. We do not have the former, and we may not have the latter. As I said 
earlier, I do not deny that the term 'resurrection' was used early, but the question 
is what this term meant. We should note that we have no reason to think that what 
Paul refers to as an appearing of the risen Jesus to him even involved seeing Jesus' 
body. Paul does not describe the experience, and the second-hand account in Acts 
9:3-6 does not mention Paul's seeing Jesus' body. I do not claim that this proves 
that such appearings did not involve seeing Jesus' body, only that they may not 
have. Moreover, I can grant Davis' point (p. 101-102) that sometimes only later 
does a person appreciate the significance of some event, but this does not imply that 
the person's memory of details of the event also improves with time. Indeed, his 
then-current convictions about the significance may contribute to an unconscious 
altering of his memory-impressions. 
Davis correctly states my reason for claiming that there must be a pattern of 
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miraculous events into which a claimed miracle fits, but I do not think that I push it 
as far as he thinks I do. 7 I do not demand proof of other miraculous events, for that 
requirement would indeed lead to the sort of infinite regress Davis mentions. What 
I require is the rational belief that there occurred a pattern of clearly nonnatural 
events which are rationally believed to have been caused by God. Grounds for the 
former belief would be the details of the events and one's current understanding of 
natural processes; grounds for the latter would be one's understanding of God's 
purposes and power. Davis accepts something similar: "that I rationally believe 
that God has acted nonnaturally and similarly in the past" (p. 105), but he does not 
tell us what rational grounds he thinks there are for this belief. I continue to hold 
that the grounds must include good reason to believe that events have occurred for 
which a naturalistic explanation is very unlikely. And apart from divine revelation 
that they have occurred without specification of when and where (and I know of no 
claims to this effect), I can think of no such reason other than beliefs about the 
occurrence of specific events which are apparently nonnatural. 
We could seek such events in the Bible or in contemporary life. In my earlier 
paper, I claimed that neither source looks promising. Davis disagrees, claiming 
that there are events in both places "whose best explanation is that they are miracu-
lous acts of God" (p. 106). But his only specific example is a case from a book of 
miracles of healing. I readily grant that dramatic cases of healing, sometimes in the 
context of prayer for the sick, do occur, and that some of these cases are such that 
each one, considered solely in the context of its own circumstances and ofcertain 
religious beliefs, can plausibly be seen as a soft miracle. The problems I have with 
such examples come from putting them in a larger context. Often in apparently 
similar cases healing does not occur, despite prayer. Sometimes it occurs without 
prayer. Sometimes it occurs in the context of "positive thinking" or various self-
help disciplines. Given this diversity, is miraculous healing by God really the best 
explanation for some or all of the healings? I do not think so. (As for biblical mira-
cles, their details are generally much less well-attested than is the resurrection and 
thus of doubtful value in giving rational grounds for believing that nonnatural 
events occur.) Thus, I still do not believe we have good grounds for thi nking that 




1. In allocating the force of these considerations as \ do, I am in agreement with Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
"Response," The Resurrection Debate , ed. Terry L. Miethe (New York: Harper, 1987), pp. \30-31. 
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2. In that paper Davis spoke of naturalism rather than of antisupernaturalism. But given the way 
he defined naturalism (as essentially involving atheism), I need another term to speak of Christians 
who are not supernaturalists. Thus, I use 'antisupernaturalists' to refer to them and to naturalists. 
Perhaps Davis' terminology suggests that his original focus was on non-Christians who deny the 
resurrection rather than on Christians who affirm it in a different sense, who were important in my 
paper. 
3. This consideration also tells against Davis' claim that minor discrepancies are evidence that a 
story is genuine, for if it had been a deliberate fabrication, no discrepancies would have been 
permitted (p. 107). While I am not defending the idea that the disciples sat down and deliberately 
fabricated stories, even if they had, there is no reason to think that they could have so controlled 
their dissemination as to prevent minor or even major discrepancies from creeping in. 
4. Willi Marxsen, The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968). pp. 
135-36. In my original paper, I pointed out (n. IS) that 'resurrection' might have been the closest 
available term, which Christian adopted for their purposes as they adopted agape, which they gave 
a new meaning. But the new meaning of the latter term could be defined by behavior; this sort of 
control would not have been available for 'resurrection.' 
5. E.g., Pannenberg, op. cit., pp. 131-32. 
6. Davis' claim (p. 107) that early Christians died for their faith in the resurrection is surely an 
overstatement (if he means the resurrection in his sense). They died for their faith, but the aspect 
of their faith that provoked martyrdom generally was not the resurrection; it was refusal to participate 
in the official cult of the Empire. If they had participated, the Romans would not have cared what 
the Christians believed about Jesus after his death. 
7. Davis does not cite any text where I require proof that other miracles occurred, nor can I find 
any. Perhaps my strongest expression is that there must be "clearly nonnatural events." Davis 
correctly points out that something can be clear to one person and not to another (p. 106), thus 
raising the question of my standard for 'clear.' 1 ask for events whose details we have good rcason 
to believe are such as to make it at least difficult to imagine that there is a naturalistic explanation. 
I claimed that neither in the Bible nor in ordinary life do we find such events. 
8. Davis confuses the issue with his mention (p. 106) of a religious person's seeing a sunrise as 
evidence of God's presence. Surely this occurs, but the sunrise is not a nonnatural event. Seeing 
God's presenco:; in an event does not imply that one judges the event to be a miracle in the sense of 
an event which contravenes some natural law. 
